From c8f1c64de45c7a1fefed69d902164f3577aac817 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Vong <alexvong1995@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 5 Jan 2019 23:20:41 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] gnu: libarchive: Replace with libarchive 3.3.3 and fix
CVE-2018-{1000877,1000878,1000880}.
* gnu/packages/backup.scm (libarchive)[source, home-page]: Use HTTPS.
[replacement]: New field.
(libarchive-3.3.3): New variable.
* gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000877.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000878.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000880.patch: New files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them.
---
gnu/local.mk | 5 +-
gnu/packages/backup.scm | 22 ++++-
.../patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000877.patch | 45 ++++++++++
.../patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000878.patch | 86 +++++++++++++++++++
.../patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000880.patch | 51 +++++++++++
5 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000877.patch
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000878.patch
create mode 100644 gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000880.patch
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
# Copyright © 2016 Adonay "adfeno" Felipe Nogueira <https://libreplanet.org/wiki/User:Adfeno> <adfeno@openmailbox.org>
# Copyright © 2016, 2017, 2018 Ricardo Wurmus <rekado@elephly.net>
# Copyright © 2016 Ben Woodcroft <donttrustben@gmail.com>
-# Copyright © 2016, 2017, 2018 Alex Vong <alexvong1995@gmail.com>
+# Copyright © 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 Alex Vong <alexvong1995@gmail.com>
# Copyright © 2016, 2017 Efraim Flashner <efraim@flashner.co.il>
# Copyright © 2016, 2017 Jan Nieuwenhuizen <janneke@gnu.org>
# Copyright © 2017 Tobias Geerinckx-Rice <me@tobias.gr>
@@ -877,6 +877,9 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/liba52-use-mtune-not-mcpu.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2017-14166.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2017-14502.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000877.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000878.patch \
+ %D%/packages/patches/libarchive-CVE-2018-1000880.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/libbase-fix-includes.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/libbase-use-own-logging.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/libbonobo-activation-test-race.patch \
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
;;; Copyright © 2018 Mark H Weaver <mhw@netris.org>
;;; Copyright © 2018 Oleg Pykhalov <go.wigust@gmail.com>
;;; Copyright © 2018 Ricardo Wurmus <rekado@elephly.net>
+;;; Copyright © 2019 Alex Vong <alexvong1995@gmail.com>
;;;
;;; This file is part of GNU Guix.
;;;
@@ -194,11 +195,12 @@ backups (called chunks) to allow easy burning to CD/DVD.")
(define-public libarchive
(package
(name "libarchive")
+ (replacement libarchive-3.3.3)
(version "3.3.2")
(source
(origin
(method url-fetch)
- (uri (string-append "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-"
+ (uri (string-append "https://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-"
version ".tar.gz"))
(patches (search-patches "libarchive-CVE-2017-14166.patch"
"libarchive-CVE-2017-14502.patch"))
@@ -258,7 +260,7 @@ backups (called chunks) to allow easy burning to CD/DVD.")
;; libarchive/test/test_write_format_gnutar_filenames.c needs to be
;; compiled with C99 or C11 or a gnu variant.
#:configure-flags '("CFLAGS=-O2 -g -std=c99")))
- (home-page "http://libarchive.org/")
+ (home-page "https://libarchive.org/")
(synopsis "Multi-format archive and compression library")
(description
"Libarchive provides a flexible interface for reading and writing
@@ -270,6 +272,22 @@ archive. In particular, note that there is currently no built-in support for
random access nor for in-place modification.")
(license license:bsd-2)))
+(define-public libarchive-3.3.3
+ (package
+ (inherit libarchive)
+ (version "3.3.3")
+ (source
+ (origin
+ (method url-fetch)
+ (uri (string-append "https://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-"
+ version ".tar.gz"))
+ (patches (search-patches "libarchive-CVE-2018-1000877.patch"
+ "libarchive-CVE-2018-1000878.patch"
+ "libarchive-CVE-2018-1000880.patch"))
+ (sha256
+ (base32
+ "0bhfncid058p7n1n8v29l6wxm3mhdqfassscihbsxfwz3iwb2zms"))))))
+
(define-public rdup
(package
(name "rdup")
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+Fix CVE-2018-1000877:
+
+https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libarchive/+bug/1794909
+https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/1105
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-1000877
+https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-1000877
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/021efa522ad729ff0f5806c4ce53e4a6cc1daa31
+
+From 021efa522ad729ff0f5806c4ce53e4a6cc1daa31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 17:56:29 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a double-free when a window size of 0 is specified
+
+new_size can be 0 with a malicious or corrupted RAR archive.
+
+realloc(area, 0) is equivalent to free(area), so the region would
+be free()d here and the free()d again in the cleanup function.
+
+Found with a setup running AFL, afl-rb, and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+index 23452222..6f419c27 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+@@ -2300,6 +2300,11 @@ parse_codes(struct archive_read *a)
+ new_size = DICTIONARY_MAX_SIZE;
+ else
+ new_size = rar_fls((unsigned int)rar->unp_size) << 1;
++ if (new_size == 0) {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++ "Zero window size is invalid.");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++ }
+ new_window = realloc(rar->lzss.window, new_size);
+ if (new_window == NULL) {
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
+--
+2.20.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+Fix CVE-2018-1000878:
+
+https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libarchive/+bug/1794909
+https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/1105
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-1000878
+https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-1000878
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/bfcfe6f04ed20db2504db8a254d1f40a1d84eb28
+
+From bfcfe6f04ed20db2504db8a254d1f40a1d84eb28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 00:55:22 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] rar: file split across multi-part archives must match
+
+Fuzzing uncovered some UAF and memory overrun bugs where a file in a
+single file archive reported that it was split across multiple
+volumes. This was caused by ppmd7 operations calling
+rar_br_fillup. This would invoke rar_read_ahead, which would in some
+situations invoke archive_read_format_rar_read_header. That would
+check the new file name against the old file name, and if they didn't
+match up it would free the ppmd7 buffer and allocate a new
+one. However, because the ppmd7 decoder wasn't actually done with the
+buffer, it would continue to used the freed buffer. Both reads and
+writes to the freed region can be observed.
+
+This is quite tricky to solve: once the buffer has been freed it is
+too late, as the ppmd7 decoder functions almost universally assume
+success - there's no way for ppmd_read to signal error, nor are there
+good ways for functions like Range_Normalise to propagate them. So we
+can't detect after the fact that we're in an invalid state - e.g. by
+checking rar->cursor, we have to prevent ourselves from ever ending up
+there. So, when we are in the dangerous part or rar_read_ahead that
+assumes a valid split, we set a flag force read_header to either go
+down the path for split files or bail. This means that the ppmd7
+decoder keeps a valid buffer and just runs out of data.
+
+Found with a combination of AFL, afl-rb and qsym.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+index 6f419c27..a8cc5c94 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
+@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ struct rar
+ struct data_block_offsets *dbo;
+ unsigned int cursor;
+ unsigned int nodes;
++ char filename_must_match;
+
+ /* LZSS members */
+ struct huffman_code maincode;
+@@ -1560,6 +1561,12 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
++ else if (rar->filename_must_match)
++ {
++ archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
++ "Mismatch of file parts split across multi-volume archive");
++ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
++ }
+
+ rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save,
+ filename_size + 1);
+@@ -2933,12 +2940,14 @@ rar_read_ahead(struct archive_read *a, size_t min, ssize_t *avail)
+ else if (*avail == 0 && rar->main_flags & MHD_VOLUME &&
+ rar->file_flags & FHD_SPLIT_AFTER)
+ {
++ rar->filename_must_match = 1;
+ ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
+ if (ret == (ARCHIVE_EOF))
+ {
+ rar->has_endarc_header = 1;
+ ret = archive_read_format_rar_read_header(a, a->entry);
+ }
++ rar->filename_must_match = 0;
+ if (ret != (ARCHIVE_OK))
+ return NULL;
+ return rar_read_ahead(a, min, avail);
+--
+2.20.1
+
new file mode 100644
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+Fix CVE-2018-1000880:
+
+https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libarchive/+bug/1794909
+https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/1105
+https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-1000880
+https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-1000880
+
+Patch copied from upstream source repository:
+
+https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/9c84b7426660c09c18cc349f6d70b5f8168b5680
+
+From 9c84b7426660c09c18cc349f6d70b5f8168b5680 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
+Date: Tue, 4 Dec 2018 16:33:42 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] warc: consume data once read
+
+The warc decoder only used read ahead, it wouldn't actually consume
+data that had previously been printed. This means that if you specify
+an invalid content length, it will just reprint the same data over
+and over and over again until it hits the desired length.
+
+This means that a WARC resource with e.g.
+Content-Length: 666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666666665
+but only a few hundred bytes of data, causes a quasi-infinite loop.
+
+Consume data in subsequent calls to _warc_read.
+
+Found with an AFL + afl-rb + qsym setup.
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c
+index e8753853..e8fc8428 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_warc.c
+@@ -386,6 +386,11 @@ _warc_read(struct archive_read *a, const void **buf, size_t *bsz, int64_t *off)
+ return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
+ }
+
++ if (w->unconsumed) {
++ __archive_read_consume(a, w->unconsumed);
++ w->unconsumed = 0U;
++ }
++
+ rab = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1U, &nrd);
+ if (nrd < 0) {
+ *bsz = 0U;
+--
+2.20.1
+
--
2.20.1